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The overarching direction for future research is the need a better 
understanding of how to foster behaviour change in the context of everyday 
cyber security. This work should repeat existing research in different 
environments to determine the validity and reliability of existing methods to 
a greater extent. 
Incoming regulations pose a significant challenge to information security 
management within organisations. New requirements such as the General 
Data Protection Regulation (effective from May 2018) have prompted 
major change programmes across organisations. The effects of the 
regulation on security behaviours in the workplace have not been 
specifically examined. 
There is a need for more research on behavioural differences between types 
of employees, or within different organisational environments, as these may 
also display different behaviours towards cyber security issues. 
A common theme within the academic literature was a need to continue to 
bring together diverse approaches to better understand cyber security 
behaviours and practices. The theories used in the research of information 
security draw on a number of distinct fields with evolving theories. 
The need for effective security education training was highlighted across 
the literature. Several academics highlighted opportunities for needs-based 
analysis to be incorporated into educational policy.
Recommendations for future research
The lack of theoretical underpinnings and critical reflection with the topic 
of security behaviours in most of the studies, makes the evidence base 
inconsistent and poor. As a result, it is not possible to recommend any 
conclusive suggestions as to ‘what works’. Greater engagement with the
fundamental principles and theoretical framings of security is needed.
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Everyday Cyber Security in Organisations 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Everyday cyber security comprises the security 
worries that emerge from the micro and proximate 
interactions, routines, rhythms and actions of 
everyday life as well as those that link the digital 
(or cyber) with the individual security concerns. 
Everyday cyber security therefore concerns both 
technological security as well as human security. 
Technological security controls focus on 
maintaining the integrity of the technology, 
ensuring usability of technological security, 
protecting from malware, and controlling access. 
Human security, on the other hand, is framed 
within interactions between people mediated 
through technology, including the sharing of 
security practices and the negotiation and 
navigation of convenient and/or effective everyday 
security practices.  
The interrelation between technological and 
human security in the context of the everyday, 
within organisational contexts, relies on a series of 
interwoven developments. First, implementing 
efficient controls in changing cultural, legal and 
social landscapes challenges the legitimacy to 
influence patterns of information production and 
sharing. Second, technological dependency 
introduces an array of security challenges as the 
separation between the externalised security 
rationale and the internal security dialogue is 
reduced e.g. if security policies (externalised 
security rationale) are seen to be unfair or ‘too 
time-consuming’ people are likely to find more 
convenient ways of using technology (internal 
security dialogue). Third, the pressure of always 
being ‘on’ highlights the importance of 
understanding everyday security practices and the 
challenges imposed by the integration of 
technology in most aspects of life and work.  
Introduction to the review 
This review explores the academic and policy 
literature in the context of everyday cyber security 
in organisations. In so doing, it identifies four 
behavioural sets that influences how people 
practice cyber security. These are: compliance 
with security policy; intergroup coordination and 
communication; phishing/email behaviour; and 
password behaviour. However, it is important to 
note that these are not exhaustive and they do not 
exist in isolation. In addition, the review explores 
the notion of security culture as an overarching 
theme that overlaps and frames the four 
behavioural sets. The aim of this review is 
therefore to provide a summary of the existing 
literature in the area of ‘everyday cyber security’ 
within the social sciences, with a particular focus 
on organisational contexts. In doing so, it develops 
a series of suggestions for future research 
directions based on existing gaps in the literature. 
The review also includes a theoretical lens that will 
aid the understanding of existing studies and wider 
literatures. Where possible, the review makes 
recommendations for organisations in relation to 
everyday cyber security.  
To this end, the review aims to: 
▪ Examine existing social science literatures 
on everyday cyber security behaviours 
within organisations. 
▪ Identify key behavioural sets that influence 
how individuals engage with and use 
technology in the workplace; including the 
individual behaviours that relate to the 
behavioural sets. 
▪ Outline the motivating factors that drive 
‘good’ behaviour in relation to the key 
behavioural sets. 
▪ Identify real and perceived barriers to 
behavioural change in the context of 
everyday cyber security as understood in 
relation to the specified behavioural sets. 
▪ Set out recommendations for future 
research approaches. 
▪ Highlight approaches which have worked 
in previous studies focusing on 
behavioural change in organisations. 
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SECTION ONE: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE 
Cyber security continues to be a central concern 
within organisations, with cyber-criminal activity 
posing a significant risk and costing vast amounts 
of money. This is, however, not surprising given 
the number of security-related threats facing 
organisations as well as employees on a daily basis 
(Sommestad et al., 2014). Recent reports suggest 
that cyber-attacks, whilst expensive for businesses 
also shake the public’s and the consumer’s 
confidence in the ability of organisations and 
governments to keep information safe (Nandi et 
al., 2016).  
Some cyber-attacks will be unknowingly enabled 
by employees, for example by falling victims to 
phishing attacks (Krombholz et al., 2015). 
Government reports suggest that in 2015, 90% of 
all companies suffered a security breach, with 75% 
of large businesses suffering a staff-related 
security breach (HM Government and PWC, 
2015). Moreover, of the worst breaches in the 
same year, 50% were found to have been caused 
by inadvertent human error (HM Government and 
PWC, 2015). Although some of these employee 
behaviours may be mitigated by technological 
advances and interventions, humans interact with 
technology as part of their everyday (Martins et al., 
2014) and so technological solutions are, at least in 
this way, limited. Human elements have also been 
of importance in other disciplines with a human-
technology interaction aspect, such as aviation, 
where there is a larger pool of knowledge about 
potential risks posed by human errors (e.g. 
Helmreich and Foushee, 1993). This goes beyond 
wider literatures on Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI) as it has security at the centre. 
Most organisations will develop cyber security 
policies in an attempt to both communicate 
envisioned threats and risks to employees as well 
as set standards for how employees should behave 
in a cyber environment. However, it is critical that 
organisations understand the human-behavioural 
factors within cyber security management 
processes (Parkin, van Moorsel and Coles, 2009). 
There has been a growing interest in investigating 
the issue of employee behaviour and attitudes and 
what implications certain behaviours and attitudes 
may have for security within organisations (Guo, 
2013). In 2014, for example, a systematic review 
of quantitative research analysed 29 studies to 
identify variables that influence compliance with 
information security policies (Sommestad et al., 
2014). The results showed that over 60 variables, 
many of which are incorporated in this review, 
have been studied in relation to information and 
cyber security policies. This, if nothing else, 
demonstrates the diversity of influences on human 
behaviour in a cyber security context. Moreover, it 
emphasises the focus on quantitative approaches to 
exploring cyber security behavioural traits, which 
has dominated much research in this area. 
Still, literature on this topic draws from many 
different disciplines, mainly those of a social 
science nature. These disciplines include, but are 
not limited to psychology (West, 2008), sociology, 
criminology, and economics (Theoharidou and 
Gritazalis, 2007). Within the psychological 
literature, the influence of personality types on 
cyber security behaviours has been explored in 
different settings (e.g. Whitty et al., 2015). This 
said, generally it has been found that personality 
plays a small role in how people behave online, 
and companies cannot change their employees’ 
individual personalities. Therefore, personality 
will not be the focus of this review. Rather, the 
focus will be on the key behavioural sets that have 
emerged in the wide range of social science 
literatures that have been reviewed in response to 
the overarching aims of this study. 
Structure of the Review 
The main body of this literature review first 
explores the notion of security culture as an 
overarching framework for understanding 
everyday cyber security practices, before 
addressing four key behavioural sets that have 
arisen from reviewing existing studies and 
theoretical frameworks. The summary sections 
outline ‘what works’ in terms of changing security 
behaviours as well as setting out the limitations of 
the literature and outlining future research 
directions, based on existing literatures and 
studies. 
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SECTION TWO: 
SECURITY CULTURE 
Before exploring the individual behavioural sets 
identified in the existing body of literature, this 
section discusses how the notion of security 
culture has been approached and understood in 
such literatures focusing on cyber security 
behaviours. 
Definitions and context based on the literature 
Like culture, security culture is a contested 
concept. There is lack of consensus in relation to 
the composition and definition of security culture 
within the literature. Security cultures are 
influenced by a range of factors within and beyond 
organisations, including positive and negative 
security behaviours and practices. Positive 
security is defined in the literature as the freedom 
to go about daily life, where security has been 
successfully negotiated by groups and individuals 
(McSweeney, 1999). It compares with what might 
be called ‘negative security’ which refers to 
freedom from threat (protection). McSweeney 
(1999, pp.94) notes that “situations of security 
breakdown cannot be considered the only litmus-
test of our conception of security”, as human needs 
go beyond this and also concern agency and moral 
choice. This approach favours “cooperation, 
inclusiveness, and the positive amelioration of 
intergroup relations” as potentially useful ways to 
ameliorate conflicts of interest and practice 
(McSweeney, 1999, p.98). 
In a broad sense, every organisation has a 
particular culture, consisting of an omnipresent set 
of assumptions that directs the activities within the 
organisation, for example, those directed towards 
security (Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2010). 
Such a security culture may refer to a set of norms 
and values developed and shared by members of 
the organisation towards different aspects of 
security (D’Arcy and Greene, 2014), which 
determines the mind-set of members towards 
security within the organisation. However, norms 
and values are difficult to quantify and researchers 
must be careful not to oversimplify the term 
‘security culture’. For example, it is important to 
note that members need to identify with the culture 
in order for it to foster the desired security mind-
set.  
There are many different academic papers and 
frameworks describing what is meant by a 
‘positive’ cyber security culture (e.g. Martin et al., 
2006; Ruighaver et al., 2007; Schlienger and 
Teufel, 2003). Taking such papers into account, an 
effective security culture would ideally involve 
adhering to security policies, reporting when 
things appear suspicious or go wrong and feeling 
comfortable to do so, as well as making security a 
priority across all levels of an organisation. 
Considered more broadly, a positive or ‘good’ 
workplace culture is understood to increase 
employee commitment and loyalty to the 
organisation (e.g. Martin et al., 2006), which may 
in turn foster a better security culture. In contrast, 
a negative or ‘bad’ security culture may 
encompass a lack of understanding of security, a 
blasé attitude towards security, and ‘non-
compliance’ towards security measures. 
Security culture is therefore important to both 
understand and encourage in organisations 
because if it is positive, employees are more likely 
to see the importance of cyber security controls 
and practices, believe in and be committed to 
enforcing them (Parsons et al., 2015; Parsons et al., 
2010; Renaud and Goucher, 2012).  
However, security culture cannot be looked at on 
a singular level as there are also subcultures within 
organisations (Kolkowska, 2011), and such 
subcultures may transcribe to different and 
conflicting values. Research highlights that value 
conflicts are important factors to take into account 
when security culture is developed in an 
organisation (Kolkowska, 2011). This links to the 
third behavioural set outlined in this literature 
review; namely, intergroup coordination and 
communication. Of course, there are other factors 
that may contribute towards whether someone 
adheres to controls. These include a country’s 
cultural norms and trust in the idea that the 
organisation protects the employees (Hovav and 
D’Arcy, 2012). Security culture does therefore not 
exist in isolation but builds on wider cultural and 
societal traits. 
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Security culture and ‘good’ cyber security 
practice 
Owing to its definition, security culture is 
generally looked at in the literature as a broad 
behavioural term, used to describe workplace 
attitudes, reactions, activities and mindsets. It 
therefore also encompasses compliance with 
security policy, password behaviour and 
phishing/email behaviour, and influences 
intergroup coordination and communication, 
which are the four behavioural sets that form the 
main part of this review. 
Researchers argue that security culture is an 
important factor in maintaining an adequate level 
of security in organisations, and contend that only 
a significant change in security culture can tackle 
the broader ‘human aspect’ element in security 
breaches (Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012). This may 
involve attempting to change employee past 
automatic (habitual) behaviours, changing 
cognitive heuristics, and developing psychological 
contracts that encompass security. To this end, if a 
security culture is poor, it may foster poor security 
behaviours in a broader sense. These poor security 
behaviours may include those in this review, such 
as bad password behaviour.  
In the context of some organisations, researchers 
have argued that there may be a culture of too 
much trust in the security systems. To this end, 
employees may believe that the IT systems in 
place protect them from any cyber-attack, and in 
doing so may feel less responsible for computer 
related security issues (Benson et al., 2018). This 
trust in security systems therefore may lead to 
misguided security practices such as trust in email 
providers to catch phishing emails.  
Habitual and past automatic behaviours relate to 
security culture as such behaviours make up, and 
are often the consequence of, a particular cultural 
attitude. Therefore, changing security culture in an 
organisation may include attempting to change the 
individual habits of employees. Vance et al. 
(2012), in a study looking at the effects of habits 
on compliance with information security policies, 
found ‘habit’ to be an important role in the context 
of employees’ compliance with information 
security policies. Habit was also found to have a 
significant influence on whether employees felt 
they were subjected to threat if they did not comply 
with information security policies. Habitual 
behaviour in IT use does not always require 
conscious behavioural intention (de Guinea and 
Markus, 2009), and so employees may perform 
unsafe cyber security behaviours without an 
explicit awareness of the potential consequences 
of their actions. 
Cultural change 
Owing to the fact that security culture 
encompasses many aspects of organisational 
behaviour, such as both knowledge and attitudes 
towards information security policies or 
procedures, changing security culture may prove a 
difficult task (Harris and Ogbonna, 1998). 
However, the literature does highlight some 
possible ways for cultural change.  
Firstly, research shows that a positive security 
culture can benefit from being led from the very 
top of an organisation – requiring executive level 
colleagues to show commitment to and take 
ownership of security-related issues (Hovav & 
D'Arcy, 2012). Similarly, this top-down approach 
needs to be understood and accepted throughout 
the organisation. It is therefore important that 
security policies and guidelines are accompanied 
with clear narratives and messages. A study by Hu 
et al. (2012) found that top management 
participation in information security initiatives 
have significant influence on employees’ attitudes 
towards compliance with information security 
policies, and strongly influences organisational 
security culture. This demonstrates how top 
management can play a proactive role in shaping 
culture within organisations. Additionally, top-
management participation in security practices and 
training will also improve the quality of 
management of information security according to 
the literature (Soomro et al., 2016). 
The examined literature also builds on a lot of 
research on awareness campaigns. Awareness 
campaigns are based on the premise that 
employees should be made aware of their security 
responsibilities, and take them seriously, if they 
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are to be expected to comply with them. The 
literature suggests that this can be achieved by 
making it clear that their actions (or inactions) can 
have serious consequences to the organisation as 
well as themselves. This is generally implemented 
in organisations through security awareness 
programmes (Guynes and Windsor, 2012). 
Increasing awareness is seen to increase employee 
responsibility and highlight likely security threats 
to staff. (Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004). 
However, if we look at Protection Motivation 
Theory (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1997, as cited 
in Floyd et al., 2000), and the research surrounding 
fear-appeals, it becomes clear that aggressive 
‘scare tactics’ in awareness raising initiatives may 
have the opposite effect than the one intended, 
leading to counter-behaviours ultimately 
damaging the security culture of an organisation. 
Furthermore, although awareness initiatives have 
been used and researched globally (Chen et al., 
2008), security awareness plans are limited to 
organisations, or sectors of organisations, that do 
not have an existing awareness of cyber security. 
Many companies may indeed already have high 
awareness of the company’s issues and 
responsibilities surrounding cyber security. 
Research in this area has also looked into the use 
of incentives, such as sanctions and rewards, to 
change behaviour and shape culture (Herath and 
Rao, 2009). Such attempts of changing behaviour 
will be looked at in more detail within some of the 
four behavioural sets set out in the next sections, 
as research in this area tends to focus on changing 
specific behaviours or changing compliance levels 
rather than changing culture more broadly. 
Research in this area have reasonably mixed 
findings, with the outcomes of rewards and 
sanctions depending to a certain extent on other 
environmental factors, and the degree to which 
employees are rewarded or sanctioned. Some 
research in this area has suggested that the use of 
sanctions and rewards on employees have little 
effect on employee behaviour towards information 
security (Pahnila et al., 2007). This may be due to 
a variety of reasons (Glaspie and Karwowski, 
2017). For example, it has been suggested that 
rewards often fail to work if the benefit of non-
compliance outweighs the perceived incentive 
(Vance et al., 2012). Furthermore, Farahmand et 
al. (2013) argue that incentives should only be 
used if they influence a large number of people to 
act for the common cause, and other incentives are 
inefficient. Furthermore, other researchers have 
argued that if prosocial behaviour is developed 
within an organisation, the need for sanctions or 
rewards to influence compliance with security 
policy is eliminated (Thomson and van Niekerk, 
2012). In a prosocial workplace, employees are 
concerned about and adherent to information 
security policies.  
In relation to this, researchers have also speculated 
the extent to which the new General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) will have an effect 
on the way companies approach and deal with 
cyber security (Becker et al., 2017). Psychologists 
and other disciplines may look at the effect of 
relevant regulations and make predictions about 
whether financial penalties will assist in 
encouraging the development of a better employee 
security culture.  This will likely be affected by the 
extent to which employees feel the GDPR is in 
their interest (Fritsch, 2015). 
The use of ‘security champions’ has also been 
investigated in the literature. Security champions 
are a way to promote and monitor security policy 
at an employee level, encouraging local 
representatives to demonstrate and lead by 
example (Becker et al., 2017). Gabriel and Furnell 
(2011) suggest a security champion should 
promote and foster awareness, motivation, and 
compliance. The concepts driving security 
champions stems from the idea of the influence of 
social control on employee’s security habits (Hsu 
et al., 2015). Research shows that formal control 
and social controls, both individually and 
collectively, can enhance both role specific and 
extra-role security behaviours (Hsu et al., 2015). 
Research has also shown that security champions 
need to take into account the differing viewpoints 
and subcultures across organisations, and not miss 
the opportunity to engage the wider organisation 
(Becker et al., 2017). In this way, security 
champions can be used as ‘bottom-up’ agents, to 
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change better improve policy, rather than working 
from a ‘top-down’ approach to ensure compliance 
with existing, and possibly flawed policy (Becker 
et al., 2017).  
The theory of ‘behavioural nudging’ (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008) has also been studied in the cyber 
security context. The theory suggests that people 
can be nudged towards certain choices and 
behaviours, given certain environmental cues, 
without forcing outcomes on anyone (Benson et 
al., 2018; Coventry et al., 2014). Therefore, 
applying this theory to cyber security in the 
workplace may be useful in leading to more 
vigilant behaviours by employees. This theory has 
also been applied to try and nudge the public 
towards using more secure wireless networks 
(Turland et al., 2015).  
Limitations and Conclusions 
It is becoming widely accepted in the literature that 
creating a positive information security culture is 
key to maintaining healthy security behaviours in 
the workplace (Karyda, 2017). However, there are 
some major gaps in the research within this area. 
Firstly, research focusing on defining and 
measuring the cybersecurity culture is lacking 
(Gcaza and von Solms, 2017). There is also a lack 
of valid data and studies on what initiatives 
actually work to change culture. Within the 
existing body of knowledge, the review has 
highlighted a number of additional research gaps 
and needs as also highlighted by Karyda (2017):  
▪ there is a need to explore subcultures 
further; 
▪ the need for uncontested definitions of 
information security culture;  
▪ the need to look at the crossovers and 
effects between organisational structure 
and management practices and their effects 
on security culture;  
▪ the need to research the impact of overall 
organisational culture, comparisons 
between security culture raising programs;  
▪ and the effects of employee culture outside 
the workplace on security culture.  
This list is not exhaustive and highlights the 
plethora of open questions and opportunities for 
future research on security culture and related 
themes. At a time when most organisations are 
referring to the need to change security culture and 
security mindsets, it is particularly important for 
researchers to begin to fill existing knowledge 
gaps. 
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SECTION THREE: 
BEHAVIOURAL SETS 
This section sets out the four behavioural sets that 
have been identified in the literature as the 
dominant behaviours. Whilst these sets are not 
exhaustive, they also do not exist in isolation. This 
means that there are a number of overlaps between 
the different behavioural sets and that they include 
aspects of other behavioural sets not covered in 
this review.   
Each behavioural set is divided into five sub-
sections which (1) introduces key definitions and 
context based on the literature, (2) sets out specific 
behaviours related to the overarching behavioural 
set, (3) identifies motivating factors driving ‘good’ 
behaviour in the context of the specific 
behavioural set, (4) outlines identified barriers to 
behavioural change, and (5) recommends ‘what 
works’ as gleaned from the literature. 
‘Compliance’ with security policy 
The first behavioural set identified in the literature 
relates to compliance in the context of security 
policy within organisations. 
Definitions and context based on the literature 
Compliance refers to ‘the state or fact of according 
with or meeting rules or standards’ (Oxford 
Dictionary). Compliance in relation to security 
policy and procedures is a hot topic in most 
organisations. This particularly applies at the 
board level as organisations face an increasing 
amount of statutory and regulatory requirements, 
such as the GDPR. While measuring overall 
compliance levels is a complex task, under GDPR 
executives will face renewed and intense pressure 
to achieve high levels of employee compliance as 
part of wider security goals.  
In the context of security, it is widely accepted that 
compliance with adequate information security 
policies will lead to a more secure information 
security level within an organisation. However, 
achieving an ideal security policy compliance 
level is a complicated task (Sommestad et al., 
2014), and a range of literature highlights that even 
when information security policies and documents 
are in place within an organisation, its employees 
do not necessarily comply with its requirements 
(Ifinedo, 2014; Hazari et al., 2009). In some cases, 
policies are viewed as merely guidelines rather 
than mandated instructions, while employees may 
also choose not to comply for reasons of 
convenience when carrying out day-to-day roles 
(Herath & Rao, 2009). 
In fact, over half of all information security 
breaches are estimated to be indirectly or directly 
caused by employee failure to act in accordance 
with information security procedures (Stanton et 
al., 2005). In addition to academic research, 
frequent security incidents and industry surveys 
highlight the difficulties of enforcing security 
through compliance, and suggest that while 
policies and procedures may be in place, many 
employees and outside contractors will not 
comply. Additionally, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) survey reports have 
highlighted end-user policy as one of the key 
challenges in achieving target levels of 
information security (Herath and Rao, 2009). 
As a complex topic, understanding compliance 
within an information security policy environment 
should be a cross-discipline exercise, including but 
not limited to research from the psychology and 
criminology fields (Aronson et al., 2010). As 
explained below, a dominant approach stems from 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TBP), 
encompassing Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) as a 
framework to explain behaviours including 
information security policy compliance (Hazari et 
al., 2009). Examining mechanisms of behavioural 
change through theories such as these, researchers 
have identified factors that have significant impact 
on employee beliefs and attitudes to information 
security policy, as well as employee intention to 
comply. 
As well as explaining employee behaviours and 
motivations for poor information security 
compliance, a number of a behavioural approaches 
explore methods for improving employees’ 
compliance with the security procedures of their 
organisation. Campaigns to inform employees on 
threat severities, as well as campaigns addressing 
employee self-efficacy, social norms within the 
organisation and wider security culture, and 
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comprehensive enforcement systems all propose to 
impact compliance behaviour. 
Behaviours related to the behavioural set 
Employees fail to comply with information 
security procedure for a number or reasons. 
Several socio-cognitive theories explain why an 
employee may, implicitly or deliberately, violate 
security principles, and many of the targeted 
behavioural approaches, are interdisciplinary in 
nature. Research draws on a combination of 
rational choice and decision-making theories, 
deterrence theory, and other principles from 
criminology, psychology and other research areas 
to explain behaviours and attitudes to compliance. 
In addition, an examination of an employees’ 
perceived compliance burden as well as 
detrimental impact on productivity lead to the 
emergence of ‘shadow security’ behaviours 
(Kirlappos et al., 2014). 
Employee attitudes towards compliance have been 
shown to determine intention to comply with 
security policy. Applying rational choice theory 
(the principle that individuals tend to make logical 
decisions), an employee’s attitude is influenced by 
benefits of compliance, the cost of compliance, 
and the cost of non-compliance. The employees’ 
beliefs significantly affect employees’ assessment 
of consequences, which in turn affect an 
employee’s attitude. (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
Perceptions on the actual and anticipated costs and 
benefits of compliance to the employee and to the 
organisation are key factors in the compliance 
decision. The individual will consider their own 
needs rather than the more ‘altruistic’ process of 
compliance (Beatement et al., 2008). 
Habit and experience have been shown to strongly 
affect decision-making when it comes to employee 
compliance, explained through Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT), which explains how 
individuals determine a reaction to a threat, or ‘fear 
appeal’ (Vance et al., 2012). The importance of 
past behaviour and habit are highlighted through 
PMT and involve a cognitive process to perceive 
threats, looking at the potential rewards of the 
threat, its severity (magnitude of the threat), and 
vulnerability (susceptibility to the threat). It also 
includes cognitive processing of factors enabling 
an individual to deal with a threat: response 
efficacy (perceived benefits by acting to remove 
the threat), response cost (to the individual for 
implementing the protective behaviour) and self-
efficacy (the belief that the protective behaviour 
may be implemented). In the context of 
information security within an organisation, Vance 
et al. (2012) research found nearly all components 
of PMT significantly impacted employee intention 
to comply with information security.  
Deterrence on non-compliant behaviour relates to 
organisational punishment mechanisms and 
sanctions in this context. Deterrence theory 
suggests that certainty, severity and celerity 
(swiftness) of penalties affect people’s decisions 
on whether to commit a crime or not. In a seminal 
study applying deterrence to information security, 
classical deterrence theory suggested stating 
penalties for information security policy non-
compliance increases security behaviour (Straub, 
1990), however, this assertion has been challenged 
by other studies (e.g. Pahnila et al., 2007).  
Finally, the idea of compliance as a binary decision 
(‘complying, or not’) has been challenged by 
Kirlappo et al. (2014) who highlighted a third 
response: “shadow security”. Shadow security 
practices emerge where security-conscious 
employees believe they cannot comply with a 
prescribed security policy, and therefore create a 
more fitting alternative to the policies suggested by 
the organisation’s official security functions. 
These workarounds are usually not visible to 
official security employees or higher management. 
This behavioural pattern emerges from the conflict 
employees face in trying to carry out their roles 
while managing risks as far as possible, 
representing a compromise that may or may not be 
as secure as the official policy. It represents a 
response where security policy has become 
problematic or overly onerous on an employee.  
Motivating factors driving ‘good’ behaviour 
Social influences have been shown to be greatly 
influential in forming employees’ intention to 
comply with security procedure, and can be 
explained through the Theory of Planned 
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Behaviour (TBP) approach. The TPB examines 
social influence, referring specifically to a change 
in an individual’s attitudes or behaviours as a 
result of interactions from another individual or 
group. The theory proposes that individual 
behaviour is influenced by attitudes (positive or 
negative feelings towards engaging in a specified 
behaviour), subjective norms (an individual’s view 
of what people important to them would think 
about a given behaviour) and perceived 
behavioural control (the individual’s beliefs on the 
resources needed to facilitate a behaviour) 
(Ifinedo, 2014). Top management participation in 
information security initiatives has been shown to 
have direct and indirect influence on employee 
attitudes towards information security policies  
Social norms also apply through social bonding 
theories relating to social control. Social control is 
a sociological concept referring to a mechanism 
that regulates individual and group behaviour, 
leading to compliance with the rules of a given 
group. In a control context, employees’ intentions 
have been shown to be significantly influenced by 
co-worker behaviours, as well as social pressures 
exerted by subjective norms (Cheng et al., 2013). 
These suggest that the influence of informal social 
control, based on customs and social values and 
implemented by unofficial controlling individuals, 
can have a real impact on policy compliance. As 
organisations are also social groups, the research 
carried out by Cheng et al. (2013) suggests that the 
same social control mechanisms are applicable to 
organisations. The effects of attachment to one’s 
organisation and job are significant, while the 
expectations of colleagues, managers and 
significant others showed significant influence on 
employees’ policy violation intentions (Cheng et 
al., 2013).  
Compliance is also likely to be affected by an 
employee’s attitudes to their employer overall, 
with loyalty being an important theme. More 
specifically, the ‘psychological contract’ between 
the employee and the employer, which refers to 
any unwritten expectations and to how the 
relationship between the employee and their 
employer is perceived, has shown that feelings of 
loyalty and willing compliance may also influence 
security policy compliance (Han et al., 2017). To 
this end, the study of information security 
compliance necessarily requires a thorough 
understanding of employee and employer 
motivations and the assumptions that go along 
with these, in order to fully understand decisions 
about which practices are followed.  
Factors such as employee threat perception on the 
severity of breaches along with response 
perceptions or response efficacy, self-efficacy and 
response costs all affect attitudes to security 
policy, and have an impact on policy intentions. 
Information quality and security awareness have 
been shown to impact on employee compliance. 
Information security awareness positively affects 
both attitudes and an employee’s outcome beliefs, 
leading to an increased intention to comply with 
information security policy (Burgurcu et al., 
2010). Organisational commitment is able to 
impact intentions through promoting believes that 
employees actions have an effect on the 
organisation’s overall information security. 
(Herath and Rao, 2009).  
Barriers to behavioural change 
The key barriers to greater compliant behaviour 
levels are poor security culture and employees’ 
negative attitudes to compliance, which may be 
further entrenched by a number of factors, 
including unmanageable sanctions and reward 
enforcement of sanctions and reward, as well as 
the perceived hindrance of compliance. Results 
from survey data collections within organisations 
provide empirical support that security culture is a 
driver for employee security compliance within an 
organisation. (D’Arcy and Green, 2014). If 
employees perceive the organisation to have a lax 
security culture and not to prioritise information 
security policy compliance, the data suggests that 
it will follow that compliance will be lower than 
organisations with a more proactive culture.  
Research output on disciplinary methods and 
punishment suggests mixed findings on the 
deterrence of poor compliance. Research focus on 
compliance in general suggest sanctions and 
penalties as a deterrence mechanism, implicitly 
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suggesting that when security policy violations are 
severely punished, employees will no longer carry 
out the offending actions. However, there are a 
number of counter-arguments suggesting that this 
is not necessarily effective in theory or in practice. 
Kirlappos et al. (2014) outline that the challenges 
of complete monitoring across widespread 
activities and disciplining a large number of 
employees, who are known to breach compliance 
policy, make it an unmanageable task to carry out 
effectively. Without a very significant investment 
of financial and human resources, sanctions cannot 
be enforced evenly, and sanctions that are not 
enforced are not an effective deterrent and do not 
impact compliance rates. Furthermore, heavy-
handed enforcement can prove a barrier to 
effective behavioural change, instead promoting 
tensions between security enforcers and the rest of 
the organisation (Kirlappos et al., 2014). Forcing 
conformance to compliance policy through 
disciplinary methods has also been shown to lead 
to inefficiency in terms of ‘compliance delay’. As 
well as negative attitudes to a policy, employees 
may wait until the last possible opportunity to 
comply, potentially causing operational issues. 
(Belanger et al, 2017). Examples of this may 
include users accidentally becoming locked-out of 
a system or application having forgotten to reset 
their password in the mandated window, or a 
potential application delay if employees try to 
complete mandatory online training en-masse.  
On the other hand, persuasion will also be limited 
if compliance conflicts with employee 
productivity in their roles. If employees feel that 
complying with the security policy will prove to be 
a hindrance to their day-to-day activity, with 
burdensome mechanisms more likely to slow them 
down, this will be viewed as ‘time wasted by 
security’ and will lead to conscious violation of 
policy. Frustration on behalf of employees leads 
negative attitudes to the policy which will 
influence compliance intention. (Herath and Rao, 
2009; Kirlappos et al., 2014). These attitudes 
subsequently limit the effectiveness of awareness 
and educational campaigns as employees discredit 
information and may even progress to discourage 
compliance even with policies that cause 
minimum convenient as ‘it all adds up’ (Kirlappos 
et al., 2014). 
Recommendations and ‘what works’ 
Parsons et al.’s (2015) research highlighted a small 
to moderate positive relationship with information 
security culture and employees’ information 
security decision-making. Encouraging 
improvements to an organisation’s security culture 
was suggested to benefit security management 
programmes and the behaviour of employees, 
which in turn should improve compliance with 
security policies (Parsons et al., 2015). Several 
aspects within a security culture are suggested to 
impact the intentions and motivations of 
employees; a complex set of interactions that may 
refer to security communications, effective 
monitoring and sanctions enforcement and 
management commitment. Education and 
awareness campaigns should take into account 
employees past and automatic behaviour in 
attempts to achieve behavioural change (Vance et 
al., 2012), while deterrence and social bonding 
theories suggest that subjective norms and co-
worker behaviours significantly influence 
employee intentions. Developing and launching 
initiatives to encourage positive attitudes towards 
security policy and establish consensus-building 
programmes can utilise protection motivation 
theory and social control theories to encourage 
compliance. 
Overall, research is mixed when it comes to 
sanctions and rewards, with no conclusive 
evidence highlighting intrinsic virtues in either. 
Findings suggest that neither certainty of sanctions 
(how likely the sanction is to be enforced) nor 
application of rewards appear to have any 
significant effect on compliance (Pahnila et al., 
2007; Cheng et al, 2013). While organisations 
have a far stronger emphasis on penalties, with 
indications that high-cost penalties resulted in 
improved employee knowledge of policies, this 
did not translate to any increase in attitude or 
instances of self-reported behaviour (Parsons et al, 
2015). The perceived severity of sanctions was 
seen to impact intention to comply, suggesting 
organisations would benefit from clear 
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declarations on enforcement structures and 
punishments for policy violations (Cheng et al., 
2013).  Reward enforcement may be an alternative 
for organisations where sanctions do not 
successfully prevent violation, supporting a wider 
general deterrence theory. There are significant 
interactions within punishment and reward and 
(deterrence theory more broadly) that indicate a 
need for a comprehensive enforcement system, 
through which a reward enforcement scheme can 
help establish and emphasize organisation moral 
values (Chen et al., 2012).  
The employee relationship is another key area 
where improving dynamics can lead to positive 
behavioural change.  This is supported by further 
studies which highlight that employees’ attitude, 
normative beliefs and habits all influencing the 
intention of employees to comply with security 
policy. While these can be influenced by a number 
of factors, there is empirical support to suggest that 
an employee’s feeling of job satisfaction will 
influence their security compliance intention. 
These security related general work environment 
factors contribute to security compliance intention, 
with higher job satisfaction rations having an 
increased tendency towards compliant security 
behaviour (D’Arcy and Green, 2014). The 
research suggests that organisations that create a 
work environment where employees are satisfied 
will not only benefit through improved quality of 
life, but increase. Recommendations specifically 
refer to human resource initiatives such as job 
enrichment programmes, contributing to job 
security as a way to drive positive security 
behaviour (D’Arcy and Green, 2014). 
Similarly, social norms and the ‘social contract’ 
between employees and employers from the 
perspective of security theory can illustrate how 
perceived self-efficacy may impact compliance. 
Practitioners should utilise the influence of 
positive social pressure (normative beliefs) from 
executives, supervisors and peers to form a social 
environment that best encourages positive security 
behaviours (Pahnilo et al., 2007; Hu et al, 2012). 
In terms of the theory of the social contract, this is 
generally understood to be accompanied by the 
freedom of the individual to order actions and 
dispose of resources as thought fit to ensure 
security. Resource availability is a factor that can 
significantly affect the perceived self-efficacy of 
an employee when it comes to security, which in 
turn predicts compliance policy intentions. This 
has implications for how shadow security practices 
may be approached as having a potentially positive 
impact on security if negotiated correctly. It is 
suggested that organisations should try to learn 
from shadow security behaviours, assisting the 
development of a ‘workable’ security policy that 
offers security without impeding on the 
organisation’s business (Kirlappos et al., 2014). 
Intergroup coordination and communication 
This second behavioural set identified in the 
literature relates to intergroup coordination and 
communication within organisations. 
Definitions and context based on the literature 
A group refers to a collection of people with shared 
characteristics (Brown, 1988). Such as those 
within a peer-group, school, or organisation. The 
study of inter-group coordination and 
communication looks at interaction between two 
or more collections of groups. Disagreements 
between groups may strengthen a group divide and 
miscommunication (Brown, 1988). Therefore, 
dynamics and coordination within and between 
work teams can have a significant effect on the 
ways in which an organisation practices and 
communicates cyber security. 
Intergroup coordination and communication have 
been studied in a wide array of disciplines with a 
variety of methodologies. Economics, sociology 
(both Functionalist and Marxist), psychology and 
psychiatry are all represented in the diverse 
research on this topic (Nelson, 1989). A sector of 
this research has looked into the importance of 
intergroup relations within organisations, and their 
effects on organisational functioning. Group 
norms inevitably develop in organisations, perhaps 
depending on job level, or department sector. 
Therefore, conflict can sometimes develop when 
the groups within the workplace do not 
communicate effectively. 
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Behaviours related to the behavioural set 
In this instance, intergroup coordination and 
communication may refer to behaviours that 
develop from the divide between high-level 
managers and low-level employees – both not 
understanding how one’s behaviours may 
influence, or are seen by, the other (Albrechtsen 
and Hovden, 2009). For example, high-level 
managers may not understand how some policies 
have practicality issues, or give employees (a 
feeling of) information overload. One relevant 
study found that the most frequently used cyber 
security measures in companies in Norway are 
technological measures, instead of more effective 
awareness campaigns (Merete Hagen et al., 2008). 
If we understand this from an inter-group 
dynamics perspective, as defined above, this may 
highlight misunderstanding on the part of 
management, when it comes to determining what 
works for employees. Moreover, it suggests that 
security policies may be based on perceived or 
imagined behaviours amongst lower-level staff – 
rather than actual or real behaviours and practices. 
Inter-group coordination and ocmmunication also 
refers to a sort of ‘digital divide’ (Albrechtsen and 
Hovden, 2009) between those highly 
knowledgeable in information/cyber security and 
employees with less expertise or who perceive 
themselves to be less knowledgeable. In addition, 
research has demonstrated that cyber security 
professionals in some organisations can tend to 
regard some employees as a potential threat, 
whereas employees believe that they should be 
seen and treated as a resource for security 
practitioners (Adams and Blandford, 2005). 
Motivating factors driving ‘good’ behaviour 
As demonstrated above, research highlights that a 
large problem in this area is that security managers 
and other, perhaps less digitally minded, have 
different points of view in regard to information 
security practices (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 
2009). These misunderstandings are likely then to 
be further polarised if the differing groups have no 
contact or communication with each other. 
Differing skills, such as those with technological 
skills and those without, have also been shown by 
research to polarise groups further (Grugulis and 
Vincent, 2009). Therefore, rather than anything 
driving good behaviour here, it seems clear that 
developing better communication between these 
groups, and developing understanding about the 
issues that have arisen, is the key to reducing 
conflict and addressing different group dynamics.  
Barriers to behavioural change 
It is widely accepted that disagreements between 
groups may lead to inter-group tensions and may 
foster poor work relations. As highlighted in the 
previous sections, such disagreements may arise 
out of a digital divide between certain employees, 
or miscommunication and misunderstanding 
between different levels of staff (Adams and 
Blandford, 2005). The user of information security 
systems is often thought of as the enemy by 
information security staff, however employees feel 
they are not. The idea that the ‘user is not the 
enemy’ (Adams and Sasse, 1999) is a response to 
the approach to security that highlights users as the 
enemy, producing clashes between security 
concerns and users’ work efficiency and practices. 
These differing perceptions therefore need to be 
overcome, if intergroup relations are to improve in 
this area.  
Multi-national organisations also pose a difficulty 
to behavioural change in regard to intergroup 
relations. In certain companies, an information 
security department may be in another country, 
and so trying to improve intergroup 
communication and relations may be difficult. 
Furthermore, it makes it hard for less digitally 
minded employees to explain any user problems 
they might be experiencing. Furthermore, security 
policies in such organisations, may reflect personal 
preferences and experiences of those creating them 
(Siponen and Willison, 2009) - and these 
preferences may differ between multinational 
sites. Research also shows that there is a level of 
disagreement generally between businesses in 
different countries regarding the top information 
security problems they face (e.g. Watson and 
Brancheau, 1991). Additionally, having a 
multinational company, or even a large multi-
departmental company, makes it challenging to 
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develop a baseline level of communication and 
awareness between groups. Research shows this to 
be an issue for information security personnel, as 
effective interactions and communications are 
necessary for mutual understandings of security 
risks among different stakeholders and 
departments (Werlinger et al., 2009). 
In addition to the previously mentioned barriers, 
there may be a level of intergroup prejudice/bias 
about and between departments and between 
levels of employees. Intergroup bias refers to the 
idea that there is a tendency for people to regard 
members of one’s own group more favourably 
than members of other groups. This can further 
lead to poor communication between groups and 
an unwillingness to understand differing views and 
perceptions. 
Recommendations and ‘what works’ 
In this area, one argument re-surfaces across the 
different disciplines looking at intergroup contact 
- ‘The Contact Hypothesis’. In simple terms, the 
contact hypothesis states that direct contact 
between groups helps to alleviate conflict (Nelson, 
1989). This hypothesis has much supporting 
evidence in a variety of fields, and research into 
this has been going on for many years (Allport, 
1954; Pettigrew, 1998). There are a few different 
ways in which researchers believe intergroup 
contact may reduce conflict. Firstly, if groups 
interact, they are able to develop positive feelings 
towards one another. Secondly, group contact 
reduces a sense of group boundaries and 
polarisation. Thirdly, contact provides and outlet 
of disagreement (Nelson, 1989). However, 
although there is scholarly agreement that contact 
reduces conflict, it is also noted that the contact 
should be positive and not competitive. 
Furthermore, there is not much clarity on how 
much contact is required to foster positive 
intergroup coordination and communication; and 
of course this changes depending on circumstance.  
In relation to everyday cyber security, research has 
shown that managers in companies view the most 
efficient way of working together and of 
influencing employee behaviour and awareness to 
be interaction in some form between users and 
security managers, e.g. in small face-to-face 
information meetings (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 
2009). However, this method has also been 
demonstrated to be one of the least frequently used 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). This idea of 
face-to-face contact between groups (in a physical, 
rather than virtual sense) to improve relations is 
therefore related to the ‘Contact Hypothesis’ 
(Pettigrew, 1998). Under certain conditions, the 
contact may act as a positive way to improve 
relations and communication between groups in 
organisations regarding cyber security.   
The idea of superordinate goals has also long since 
been studied in the literature as a way to reduce 
intergroup conflict (Sherif, 1958). Although, from 
what we have seen in the literature, the idea has yet 
to be applied to cyber security in the workplace 
specifically. The idea of superordinate goals is that 
a set of goals are developed, where it is made clear 
that to achieve these goals, participation from 
both/all groups is required. The idea postulates that 
then, if the goals are achieved, the relationship 
between the two groups becomes more 
harmonious (Gaertner et al., 2000). In cyber 
security, this could be done through highlighting 
certain goals, like improved password behaviour 
from employees, includes the whole company, and 
can only be achieved through information security 
experts, and general employees, working together. 
Of course, at this point this is just an idea, and will 
need to be corroborated by further research. 
Leadership, especially effective leadership across 
work groups, departments and whole 
organisations, is important in developing 
relationships between employees. Intergroup 
leadership (Hogg et al., 2012), also relates to the 
idea of superordinate goals, as it refers to the idea 
of leadership across organisational group 
boundaries. This is of importance because 
leadership is often required over different formal 
groups, rather than just one group. Hogg et al. 
(2012), in their paper on intergroup leadership, 
argue that developing intergroup identity is key 
and they identify ways in which leaders can do 
this. They argue that the leader should champion 
and be positive about group collaboration and l 
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should also perhaps consider a coalition of leaders 
(to reduce outgroup feelings by certain groups).  
It should also be mentioned in this section that 
while different groups or company aims may 
suffer because on intergroup conflict, others may 
thrive (Bradley et al., 2015). There is research 
suggesting that under certain conditions, 
disagreements between teams may improve 
performance. However, from the literature we 
gather that this has also yet to be looked at in 
improving cyber-security practices. 
Phishing/email behaviour 
This third behavioural set identified in the 
literature relates to phishing and email behaviour 
within organisations. With most communication 
within and between organisations and employees 
taking place over email, and with the increase in 
phishing attacks and organisations investing 
significant amounts of money in counter-
measures, this is a growing area of research. 
Definitions and context based on the literature 
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(APWG): “Phishing is a criminal mechanism 
employing both social engineering and technical 
subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal identity 
data and financial account credentials.” Social 
engineering refers to the deception where an 
attacker attempts to deceive a victim into 
performing a certain action that benefits the 
attacker, for example clicking on a malicious link 
within an email (Mitnick et al., 2002). A method 
of online identity theft, a phishing attack will, for 
instance, involve emails directing victims to visit 
fake replicas of legitimate websites. While 
automated anti-phishing tools have been 
developed (for example, Calling ID Toolbar, 
Firefox 2, ebay Toolbar), they are not entirely 
reliable (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). While 
security experts and application developers 
continue to improve phishing and spam detection 
tools, some authors continue to portray the 
‘human’ as ‘the weakest link’ in this context 
(Arachchilage and Love, 2014). As attackers 
continue to adapt their techniques to social 
engineer victims to follow a phishing email 
instruction, researchers have explored user 
education and employee email behaviour as a 
means of preventing phishing (Sheng et al., 2007). 
Email behaviours are framed within corporate 
email policy which outlines specific guidelines for 
what is deemed acceptable use and unacceptable 
use. An organisation will have an email policy in 
place aimed at equipping employees with the 
necessary tools to protect against email-related 
threats such as phishing attacks. A corporate email 
policy may also include language covering 
personal usage of corporate communications 
systems, informing whether personal emails are 
accepted.  
Behaviours related to the behavioural set 
Users are susceptible to phishing attacks for a 
number of reasons. Users may lack the awareness 
and skills needed to detect phishing attempts and 
determine between genuine and phishing 
weblinks, and may not understand security 
indicators in web browsers (Sheng et al., 2010).  
By examining factors such as personality traits, 
user awareness, education, motivation and 
perception of risk, researchers have been able to 
form theories of user behaviour when it comes to 
processing and dismissing or falling victim to 
phishing attempts. 
It is suggested that certain cognitive impulsivity 
and personality traits affect behavioural responses 
to genuine and phishing emails (Pattinson et al., 
2012). In particular, user extraversion, trust and 
submissiveness all represent variables that limit 
the self-efficacy of a user’s threat avoidance from 
phishing emails (Pattinson et al., 2012; Alseadoon 
et al., 2015).  When it comes to executing demands 
within phishing emails, the behavioural trait 
‘susceptibility’ is a variable that plays an important 
role in increasing the tendency of a user falling 
victim to the phishing request (Alseadoon, Othman 
& Chan, 2015). Studies show that helpfulness, 
trust and risk behaviours have significant impact 
on actual email behaviour (Flores et al., 2014).  
Awareness and conscientious traits also affect how 
likely the user is to display target email behaviour. 
Conscientious users are likely to apply the relevant 
knowledge to avoid either opening or committing 
any instructed action as a result of a phishing 
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email. In general, within simulations, informed 
users have managed emails better than non-
informed users (of course this raises the question 
of who we understand to be an informed user). 
Similarly, the more familiar individuals are with 
computers, the better they managed phishing 
emails, and in particular, employees with more 
email experience tended to have more suspicion of 
phishing emails (Flores et al., 2014.) 
A number of additional demographic traits have 
been shown to affect a user’s susceptibility to 
phishing attacks. Gender and age are two key 
demographics that affect phishing susceptibility. 
Although results on gender show mixed results 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009), research shows women 
are more likely than men to be susceptible to 
phishing; research studies have demonstrated that 
women click on links more often than men, and are 
also more likely to enter personal details into input 
fields. Kumaraguru et al. (2009) note that this 
appears to be due to the fact that male participants 
tended to have more technical training and 
technical knowledge compared to their female 
counterparts. These findings contrast with findings 
from another study which suggest that women tend 
to be less susceptible to a generic attack than men 
(Flores et al., 2014). This discrepancy suggests 
that further research into how different 
demographics affect security behaviour in general 
and email behaviour in particular is needed. This 
should include research to refine how gender may 
affect susceptibility to phishing attacks. Some 
studies have also found that younger users may be 
more susceptible to phishing attacks as research 
participants between the ages of 18-25 were more 
susceptible compared with other age groups 
(Sheng et al., 2010; Kumaraguru et al, 2009). 
Sheng et al. (2009) further suggest that younger 
participants may be more susceptible due to less 
experience with internet related activities, less 
exposure to training materials, and less of an 
aversion to risks.  
While there are a number of gaps in the currently 
literature (Pattinson et al., 2012), highlighting 
currently known traits that affect user’s 
susceptibility to phishing scams will enable 
attempts to target to change specific behavioural 
attributes. 
Motivating factors driving ‘good’ behaviour 
Studies have suggested that an individual’s threat 
perception, effectiveness, self-efficacy, perceived 
severity of threats and perceived susceptibility can 
positively impact threat avoidance behaviour, 
whereas safeguard cost can have a negative impact 
(Arachchilage et al., 2016).  
Victims can be manipulated through social 
engineering techniques which encourage them to 
act on the instructions given in such emails, 
however research also shows that an individual’s 
habitual trust and risk behaviour significantly 
affects actual behaviour during a simulated 
phishing experiment.  
Security awareness methods that target user 
motivation can enhance a user’s avoidance 
behaviour. In particular, game-based designs have 
the ability to encourage users to check website 
URLs as an indicator of website legitimacy. By 
providing motivation to protect against threats, 
game-based education delivery has been shown to 
engage users and lead to an improvement in threat 
avoidance in post-game tests (Arachchilage et al., 
2016). 
There is debate as to whether companies should 
phish their own employees to raise awareness. As 
‘phishing as a service’ is a widely used method in 
highlighting user susceptibility, some studies 
suggest that phishing your own employees results 
in a number of unintended consequences. Research 
has highlighted that when debriefing participants 
after a simulated phishing experiment, the majority 
of employees feel shocked, surprised and even 
angered at themselves for failing to recognise 
phishing emails. Many also felt disappointment in 
their own efficacy (Caputo et al., 2014). 
Reprimanding employees for clicking on such 
links might therefore harm the employee-employer 
trust relationship, reduce productivity and alienate 
employees, some of whom will be angry at the 
employer for deceiving them (Caputo et al.,2014). 
These factors can all play a part in reducing 
security overall (Renaud and Goucher, 2012; 
Adams and Sasse, 1999), and may lead to cases 
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where users no longer feel confident to report 
phishing emails for fear of negative consequences.  
Barriers to behavioural change 
Ineffective phishing awareness delivery has been 
shown to fail to achieve behavioural change, 
potentially by failing to challenge employee 
misconceptions. Research has highlighted cases 
where almost all employees consider annual 
company training ineffective, and failed to 
remember phishing-specific training. Employees 
claimed this training covered material they already 
knew and instructed them to act in ways they 
already did (Caputo et al., 2014). In part, poor 
training may also be due to the assumption that 
users are keen to avoid risk, which does not 
necessarily hold across all circumstances. 
Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) outline the ‘need and 
greed’ principle, highlighting that users can be 
tempted to click on links in search of a good deal; 
making them more vulnerable to scams that offer 
deals that are ‘too good to be true’. By not 
considering the drivers and user motivations, 
security awareness training offers little protection 
to this subset of individuals. This research showed 
much of the advice given through user training was 
ignored as the indicators were unknown and 
untrusted by users. This exemplifies that a number 
of security awareness campaigns may be missing 
the opportunity to encourage change as they fail to 
address user misconceptions on scam websites. It 
has also been pointed out that while security 
awareness can reduce instances of users clicking 
on phishing email links, they may also reduce user 
tendency to click on legitimate links, showing that 
users are still failing to differentiate between 
phishing and genuine emails (Sheng et al., 2010). 
Employees may also have a false sense of 
confidence in the company to prevent malicious 
emails from reading them. Participants in different 
studies have reported acting differently in the 
workplace than at home, with the knowledge of 
dedicated security colleagues, corporate firewalls 
and cyber security tools such as antivirus software 
leading to a belief in greater inherent security 
(Caputo e al., 2014). Caputo et al. (2014) found 
that these controls made participants more likely to 
click on links in emails on company computers 
than on their own personal computers, as they felt 
protected by the corporate firewall. 
Finally, increasingly sophisticated information 
targeting will make distinguishing genuine emails 
from phishing emails a more difficult task for 
potential victims. Ferguson (2015) highlights the 
issue through the example of a simulation where 
80% of participants in a phishing simulation were 
students expecting a genuine email on their grades. 
Candidate comments suggested that they would 
open almost any email relating to grades, stating 
“any email with the word ‘grades’ in it gets my 
immediate attention and action!”. The use of social 
engineering techniques to target particular types of 
victim suggests an obvious vulnerability.  
Recommendations and ‘what works’ 
Research has shown that awareness of phishing 
threats is often not sufficient to change employee 
behaviour; as an example, a user having attended 
a training course that covered phishing did not 
make them less likely to open a phishing email 
(Ferguson, 2005). While educational and 
awareness activities pertaining to email 
environments are of ‘utmost importance’, IT 
management must know and identify exactly 
where to direct and focus these awareness training 
efforts, according to Steyn et al. (2007). When 
attempting to determine why some employees 
appear less susceptible to phishing attempts, role-
playing experiments suggest that participants 
informed about phishing and its risks manage 
suspicious emails better than those who have not 
been informed (Pattinson et al., 2012). However, 
Ferguson (2005) highlights that awareness is 
necessary but not sufficient as a driver for 
behavioural change. Broad reviews and analyses 
of global information security awareness 
campaigns suggest that as well as awareness, 
employees must experience both understanding 
and motivation (Bada and Sasse, 2014), and should 
have misconceptions challenged and explained 
(Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). This highlights a 
challenge and recommendation that behavioural 
change should be at the habitual level. Further 
research supports the hypothesis that conceptual 
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and procedural knowledge positively impacts an 
employee’s self-efficacy when it comes to 
detecting phishing attempts, enhancing their threat 
avoidance behaviour (Arachlidge and Love, 2014). 
The literature therefore supports a 
recommendation for well-designed end-user 
security education that informs and enhances 
employee understanding of phishing and similar 
attack vectors, and provides a motivation to avoid 
suspected phishing attempts. As trust and risk 
behaviours have been shown to affect actual 
behaviours, it is suggested that training initiatives 
to develop these behaviours within their security 
awareness programmes are critical (Flores et al., 
2014).  
For suggestions on HR implementation in 
particular, an academic review of existing training 
models, including the NIST training models, 
concluded that it is also the method of delivery of 
training that secures effectiveness, beyond the 
knowledge conveyed. Needs analysis training is 
recommended to deliver training where objectives 
should specify the desired changes in the 
employees being changed (Brummel et al., 2016). 
By both classifying employees by role and 
performing competency modelling, one can 
determine what each role needs to know and train 
employees accordingly. This allows employers to 
identify training gaps, for example whether staff 
can currently identify phishing attempts, and 
perform a training evaluation to measure if these 
gaps have been addressed. A review of effective 
cyber training approaches suggests that all 
employees who use computer networks should be 
trained on a needs based analysis (Beyer and 
Brummel, 2015). A follow-up exercise should be 
included within training models to reinforce taught 
content (Ferguson, 2015). 
Companies may also reduce the number of 
phishing incidents through being mindful of 
exposing employees to targeted phishing. As 
research has shown the degree of target 
information used in a phishing attack increases the 
likelihood of victims being successfully deceived, 
it is suggested that organisations consider the 
benefits of publicly accessible employee email 
addresses and role titles against the risks of 
attackers using this information to design more 
effective phishing messages. (Flores et al., 2014).  
Password behaviour 
This fourth and final behavioural set identified in 
the literature relates to password behaviour within 
organisations.  
Definitions and context based on the literature 
Password behaviours in the context of this review 
will include an array of practices by users of 
systems, and those who create password policy, 
such as password composition, security practices 
and attitudes in relation to passwords (Bryant and 
Campbell, 2006). A focus on password behaviours 
is important because although strong 
authentication techniques are available, 
corporations continue to use a password-based 
system to control system access (Tam et al., 2010). 
Such text-based passwords are often seen as being 
less secure, easier to predict or guess for an 
adversary, thereby making it possible for the 
adversary to impersonate a legitimate user and 
misuse his or her authority (Shay et al., 2010). 
Even the most sophisticated security systems 
become useless if users mismanage their 
passwords, or if password policies are not tailored 
correctly (Furnell et al., 2006). There are many 
different ways password security can be 
compromised by adversaries, some of which are 
unsophisticated and require little knowledge of 
technology, while others may require high-level 
technological expertise (Furnell et al., 2006). 
Similar to email behaviours, password policy aims 
to shape password behaviours amongst employees. 
In general, these are a set of rules established to 
enhance technological security by ensuring, or at 
least encouraging individuals to use what is 
determined to be strong passwords and to employ 
them in appropriate ways. Such policies may 
include a requirement for password lengths of at 
least eight characters, passwords with mixed 
case/symbols, and the requirement to change 
passwords regularly (Furnell et al., 2006). It 
should be noted that these common policies, in 
reality, are not necessarily good practice (Tam et 
al., 2010). 
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In general, users demonstrate knowledge of what 
forms a strong password (i.e. hard to guess, using 
a variety of letters, numbers and symbols), as well 
as inappropriate password practices, such as easily 
guessed, or commonly used default passwords 
(Schneier, 2006).  
Behaviours related to the behavioural set 
As previously mentioned, specific behaviours that 
relate to password behaviour include practices by 
users of systems, and those who create password 
policy, such as password composition, security 
practices and attitudes in relation to passwords 
(Bryant and Campbell, 2006). Therefore, lots of 
behaviours and attitudes may affect a user's 
password behaviour. Tam et al. (2010) specifically 
approached five password management 
behaviours: choosing a password for the first time; 
changing a password; letting someone else use 
your password; taping passwords next to the 
computer; and sharing passwords with family, 
friends or co-workers. ‘Choosing a password for 
the first time’ and ‘changing a password’ are 
neutral behaviours, in that the actions are not 
inherently good or bad. It is how the user chooses 
and updates the password that determines whether 
the behaviour will have positive or negative 
effects. The subsequent three, ‘letting someone 
else use your password’, ‘taping passwords next to 
the computer’, and ‘sharing passwords with 
family, friends or co-workers’ are behaviours 
organisations would want users to avoid. These all 
represent negative behaviours that are seen as 
mistakes, and represent instances of poor password 
management. Research has aimed to understand 
what motivates each of these behaviours, such as 
what factors may encourage an employee to 
deliberately choose week passwords, in order to 
understand and encourage stronger security 
behaviour.  
There is also the general behavioural theme of 
password system misuse. Users may be motivated 
to engage in poor password management. One 
large-scale study of over half a million users on 
web-based password behavioural habits 
demonstrated that there is a high degree of quality 
passwords and mismanagement (Florencio and 
Herley, 2007). This may be for a number of 
reasons, as individuals do, in the end, have a choice 
about whether they comply or not with password 
policy (Weirich and Sasse, 2001). For example, 
users may not comply with password policy 
because they may not perceive negative 
consequences within their convenience-security 
trade-off calculations (Tam et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, another important factor to 
consider when looking at password behavioural 
themes is misguided password policy. For 
example, an often-referenced factor is that the 
challenge of memorising randomised and 
temporary passwords is both difficult and 
inconvenient for employees, reducing productivity 
and prompting workarounds, such as writing 
passwords down or choosing simpler passwords 
altogether (Tari and Holden, 2006). Furthermore, 
researchers have pointed out, that employees have 
to spend a lot of mental and physical time on some 
password policies and that this adds to their normal 
workload (Beautement et al., 2009).  
Motivating factors driving ‘good’ behaviour 
It is important to address the view that employees 
are not motivated to behave in a secure manner. In 
their study, Adams and Sasse (1999) found that the 
majority of users were in fact security conscious, 
as long as the users felt the need for such 
behaviours (for example owing to external 
threats). However, it should be noted that in the 
literature, there seems to be a pattern by some 
researchers suggesting that users intentionally or 
through negligence are a great threat for 
information security (Safa et al., 2015).  
The literature suggests that users understand the 
difference between good and bad behaviour, and 
that motives behind password selection and 
password management are complex and 
significant in shaping behaviours. Some users are 
more motivated by privacy issues rather than 
security. Users are also motivated by security and 
convenience simultaneously, and will make a 
trade-off between them when determining a 
password. This trade-off often determines 
password quality meaning that users will choose a 
strong password only if they are willing to 
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sacrifice convenience; awareness is not sufficient 
(Tam et al., 2010).  
Barriers to behavioural change 
Research shows that awareness of password policy 
and the consequences of passwords being 
compromised is not always enough to drive ‘good’ 
password behaviour. Studies have shown that 
users may also be aware of what makes a good or 
bad password, but still not be motivated to comply 
with this (Tam et al., 2010). The Tam et al. (2010) 
study also found that this lack of motivation was 
because users did not see any immediate negative 
consequences of engaging in ‘bad’ security 
behaviour, or because of a security-convenience 
trade-off. This is therefore a barrier to behavioural 
change, as clearly employees need a higher level 
of motivation, rather than just awareness. 
As previously noted, password policies can often 
be too demanding for employees to be able to cope 
with, or may interfere with employee work 
productivity. This therefore is a barrier to 
behavioural change. Research shows that in most 
cases, those who use workarounds to circumvent 
password policies are not ‘black hat’ hackers, but 
employees trying to do their jobs efficiently 
despite certain policies (Koppel et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, studies have shown that in order to 
deal with the demand of keeping track of many 
passwords for different accounts, users write down 
and reuse passwords, with there being diverse 
individual behaviour surrounding this (Stobert and 
Biddle, 2014). It has been further suggested by 
researchers, that this ‘bad’ password behaviour is 
actually a rational response to the high demands of 
varying policies (Stobert and Biddle, 2014). These 
findings are corroborated by many different 
studies. For example, Inglesant and Sasse (2010) 
found that employees were concerned about 
security, but that policies were inflexible and did 
not match their capabilities. Such studies 
demonstrate that these password policies can place 
demands on users which impact negatively on their 
productivity. 
Recommendations and ‘what works’ 
Password policies must strike the right balance 
between maximising the security of the 
organisation, while minimising user frustration 
and maximising user usability (Komanduri et al., 
2011). Password policies will continually have to 
be adapted and must be responsive to user 
behavioural patterns, the emergence of new 
threats, and will be dependent on the nature of the 
systems for which passwords are used. 
(a) Direct behavioural change in terms of 
encouraging behaviour change. 
Studies have found that for sensitive applications 
such as online banking log-ins, the concept of 
time-frames (i.e. whether the password will 
change immediately or in the future) will affect an 
individual’s perception of the security trade-offs, 
where weaker passwords were chosen for 
immediate change, and stronger passwords chosen 
for those due to change in the future (Tam et al., 
2010).   
(b) Indirect behavioural change through design 
mechanisms  
Surveys have revealed that user-accessibility and 
communication both discourage strong password 
behaviours, emphasising the responsibility on 
designers of security mechanisms to encourage 
responsible password behaviour by design. 
Responses suggested reducing the effort involved 
and highlighting where and why there is a need for 
a strong password within a security design, users 
are better motivated to create stronger passwords 
(Adams abd Sasse, 1999). Angela Sasse’s ongoing 
research on password use supports this conclusion, 
while related research suggests involving user 
collaboration in participatory research leads to the 
desirable outcome of both a better understanding 
of and relation to an organisation’s security 
requirements (Kani-Zabihi and Helmhout, 2011).  
The National Cyber Security Centre (2016) has 
also previously released recommendations for 
password policy to improve password behaviour, 
and is about to release an updated version. 
Recommendations revolve around dramatic 
simplification of complicated approaches to 
password policy, as highlighted at the beginning of 
this theme.  
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SECTION FOUR 
SUMMARISING ‘WHAT WORKS’ 
This section provides a brief summary of the ‘what 
works’ sections from each of the four behavioural 
sets. To preface this, it is notable that, currently, 
there is not enough research or empirical data, and 
there are too many confounding variables from 
organisation to organisation to conclude that 
certain behavioural interventions will work in 
every organisational setting. 
Awareness campaigns have been mentioned in 
almost every ‘what works’ section in this report 
(Rhee et al., 2009). Awareness campaigns have 
been shown to be effective for education and 
training (Cone et al., 2007). However, some 
studies have shown that even if these awareness 
campaigns are effective in boosting knowledge in 
cyber security, this does not necessarily mean the 
awareness campaigns actually have an impact on 
user behaviours (Albrechtsen, 2007). Researchers 
have shown that campaigns might be more 
effective if they involve more motivation, or take 
a user-involvement approach. Bada and Sasse 
(2014) note that efforts to change security 
behaviour necessitate a lot more than just giving 
information about risks and correct behaviours. It 
is argued that employees must not only be able to 
understand and apply the advice they are given, but 
they must be willing to do apply such advice, 
which requires attitudinal change (Nurse, 2015).  
Techniques for attitudinal change include 
persuasion techniques such as fear appeals. Fear 
appeals should aim to address aspects of attitudes 
such as employee optimism bias when it comes to 
some aspects of security (Rhee et al., 2005). 
Again, there is also research that counters this and 
suggests that employee knowledge of security, for 
example phishing, does enhance user behaviour 
(Arachchilage and Love, 2014; Alqahtani, 2017). 
Overall therefore, research into awareness 
campaigns is relatively mixed and, as previously 
mentioned, security awareness plans are limited to 
organisations that do not already have a good 
working knowledge of cyber security. 
The use of sanctions and rewards in order to 
encourage behavioural change also comes up in a 
few of the themes. However, the use of both is a 
contested topic in the research and literature. 
Cheng et al. (2013) recommend increased severity 
of sanctions, while Pahnil et al. (2007) conclude 
that sanctions have no significant impact on 
intention to comply. Kirlappos et al. (2014) instead 
suggest that sanctions are not an effective answer, 
and signpost to policy design. While this may 
suggest a shift in emphasis to focus on positive 
reinforcement, rewards have been shown to result 
in inferior information security decision-making 
(Parsons et al., 2015). In this case, the authors 
suggest it may be that different types of employees 
respond positively to different approaches, 
suggesting inappropriate use of rewards would be 
detrimental to compliance. These remain open 
questions and raise issues for further research in 
this area. 
As highlighted in the security culture section of 
this review, the use of top management to support 
cyber security behaviours and to improve cyber 
security in general, has been found to be effective 
(Werlinger et al., 2009). This finding can easily be 
applied to all four behavioural sets. Researchers 
have suggested that security vulnerability, and risk 
analysis reports can be used to convince top 
management about the importance of cyber 
security, and want to lead on this front (Werlinger 
et al., 2009). 
Limitations of the literature 
Overall, in relation to the four ‘what works’ 
sections of this report, it is clear that more research 
is needed to assess the reliability and validity of all 
the behavioural interventions mentioned. 
Furthermore, longitudinal studies and more studies 
to test the reliability of different interventional 
methods over time, and whether they have lasting 
effects on everyday cyber security in 
organisations. Additionally, there is a need to 
establish metrics in order for researchers to be able 
to consistently measure the effects behavioural 
interventions on behaviour. Unlike in medicine or 
clinical psychology, where randomised controlled 
trials are the gold standard, behavioural 
interventions in organisations will prove more 
difficult when trying to establish clear cut results. 
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Additionally, in certain areas of this review, the 
research findings are mixed, leading us to have 
significant reservations about recommending 
some ‘solutions’ or approaches to change security 
behaviours. For example, while a number of 
studies have examined reward and punishment, 
and the effectiveness of sanctions in particular, 
conclusions and prescriptions vary significantly 
(Cheng et al., 2013; Pahnila et al., 2007). 
Similarly, the use of awareness campaigns is also 
disputed (Bada and Sasse, 2014).  
Particularly when reviewing literature on 
compliance behaviours, a significant number of 
papers used intention to comply as the dependent 
variable, raising the question of whether intention 
indicates actual behaviour (acknowledged by 
Cheng et al., 2013). While generally there is 
support that intention may be used as a predictor 
of actual behaviour, there is no guarantee that 
surveyed individuals would behave as they have 
indicated. This forms part of the wider challenge 
when it comes to measuring compliance; not every 
type of employee violation can be evidenced, and 
this represents a major challenge beyond academia 
and for security employees. This difficulty in 
exploring and measuring actual behaviour can be 
seen in the field of research on phishing behaviour. 
Little empirical research has taken place through 
real phishing experiments in part due to the ethical 
questions of launching a phishing campaign on 
employees without providing a proper debrief. 
More specifically, very little research has focused 
on individuals in a workplace setting, which may 
be due to the difficulty involved in persuading 
organisational managers to participate in studies in 
which their employees’ performances are being 
tested. (Flores et al., 2014). Where research on 
factors affecting susceptibility to phishing attacks 
have taken place, their applicability is limited by 
the fact they large rely on the data of university 
students, with small sample sizes limiting possible 
statistical analysis on possible determinants of 
susceptibility (Flores et al., 2014).  
Finally, and importantly, the lack of theoretical 
underpinnings and critical reflection and 
engagement with the topic of security behaviours 
in most of the studies, makes the evidence base 
inconsistent and poor. As a result, it is not 
possible to recommend any conclusive 
suggestions as to ‘what works’ as we would be 
basing such recommendations on some pretty 
disconnected, isolated and more or less 
informative pieces of literature and studies.  
Directions for future research 
In general, the overarching direction for research 
is the need for more behavioural change research 
in this area, and a deeper engagement with the 
fundamental principles of security. This research 
needs to repeat existing research in different 
environments to determine the validity and 
reliability of existing methods to a greater extent. 
Furthermore, this future research should aim to use 
psychological, sociological, and economic theory 
to aid, add to, or create new, behavioural 
interventions. It has been noted in the research that 
these disciplines, such as social psychology, have 
thus far been underused in research into cyber 
security (Thackray et al., 2016), and that there are 
a lot of related theories that still need to be 
examined for their applications to this area.  
More specifically, incoming regulations pose a 
significant challenge to information security 
management within organisations. New 
requirements, such as the GDPR (effective from 
May 2018) have prompted major change 
programmes across industry. The effects of the 
regulation on security behaviours in the workplace 
have not been specifically examined. As each 
relevant aspect of the regulation is integrated into 
the workplace and organisational policies, there 
are significant research opportunities to study the 
effect of GDPR on security behaviours. 
There is a need for more research on behavioural 
differences between types of employee, or within 
different organisational environments which may 
display different behaviours towards cyber 
security issues. There is research in the existing 
literature on gender, age, and income differences 
(Akman and Mishra, 2010), however, the findings 
are inconclusive and other factors are in need of 
investigation. For example, while research has 
highlighted the relationship between job 
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satisfaction and employee intention to comply 
with security policies and procedures, this 
relationship is contingent on position, tenure and 
industry. The relationship is stronger for those 
employees with non-technical positions, in non-IT 
industries and for those with less tenure in their 
organisations. Future research should attempt to 
work out the causes of differences between job 
satisfaction, believes and attitudes between 
employees in different environments. Likewise, as 
mentioned within the above review of ‘inter-group 
dynamics’ research, there is significant scope to 
expand on cases where conflict may actually 
strengthen team performance and lead to greater 
security overall. There is plenty of opportunity to 
explore personality types and how various types of 
employee differ in their approaches to, for 
example, compliance or phishing (Pattinson et al, 
2012). With more research and empirical evidence 
will come clearer methodologies on increasing 
employee intentions to comply, whether relating to 
this specific case of job satisfaction, inter-group 
dynamics or across a number of other factors.  
The need for effective security education training 
was highlighted across the literature. Several 
academics highlighted opportunities for needs-
based analysis to be incorporated into educational 
policy. Game-based educational delivery showed 
promise in studies using prototypes, teaching users 
how to recognise phishing emails by examining 
website URLs. There are opportunities to explore 
how games can be employed to teach other key 
security lessons, encouraging the user to engage to 
protect themselves (Arachilage et al., 2015). 
More broadly, a common theme within the 
academic literature was a need to continue to bring 
together diverse approaches to information 
security behaviours. The theories used in the 
research of information security draw on a number 
of distinct fields with evolving theories. The 
ongoing development and innovation within this 
space relies on engagement with emerging theories 
across psychology, criminology, management and 
information security research areas, and 
potentially developing new theories specifically 
relevant to cyber security behaviours. 
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